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Executive Summary 
 
 Since the Financial Crisis of 2008, pension plans in the United States have sunk 
into a crisis that there seems to be no escape from. While all 50 states have at least 
one retirement system for employees, several of these systems have been repeatedly 
hit by massive problems involving funding for future benefits and paying out current 
obligations. Taken as a collective whole, public retirement systems in this country have 
been estimated to be underfunded anywhere from $934 billion to $3.2 trillion. Several 
states barely have half the money needed to meet all obligations promised. While 
several studies have been conducted to establish the reasons for these numerous 
problems affecting retirement systems in the United States, more attention should be 
paid regarding the impact of politics and partisanship on state retirement policy as a 
whole, and state retirement system funding, more specifically. This study offers such 
an analysis.  
 
 Using the funded ratio as the primary measure of retirement system health, and 
the most recent pension plan data available, a panel dataset spanning the years 2001-
2015 was created to investigate the relationship between partisanship and pension 
plan funding for state-administered retirement systems. This panel data was then 
tested via statistical analysis to determine these potential relationships. An intensive 
statistical model containing four fixed-effects regressions test the funded ratio with 16 
explanatory variables. This set of explanatory variables includes several variables 
representing partisan political control to properly conduct the analysis.  
 
 The results derived from the regressions present highly unexpected and 
interesting results. Contrary to the expected outcome, divided government has a 
positive, and significant, impact on the funded ratio of state-run retirement systems. 
Divided state government is a 0.018 increase to the funded ratio. Other unexpected 
results include no effect on the funded ratio from a Democratic governor or Democratic 
controlled state senate, and a negative effect on the ratio from a state house controlled 
by Democrats and the particular number of seats controlled by Democrats in a state 
house. The percentage of seats held by Democrats in a state senate has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the funded ratio via a 0.28 increase.    
 
 Following from the results of the fixed-effects regression analysis, the author 
recommends both political parties undertake evidence-based approaches to retirement 
system policy to ensure that funding for pension obligations is at acceptable levels. 
Attention should always be paid to retirement system policy no matter what party is in 
control, but it is of vital importance when the state is operating under divided 
government. It is also recommended that states should study and learn from the states 
that have achieved better pension policy outcomes under divided government to learn 
best practices and solutions to combat the underfunding problems and keep up with 
all current and future obligations.     
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Introduction 
 
 On November 28, 2016, Kentucky Retirement Systems (KRS), the state agency 
that administers many of the public retirement systems of the state of Kentucky, 
announced that the primary public pension plan for the state, the Kentucky Employees 
Retirement System (KERS), designed for Kentucky state employees, had 16% percent 
of the funding that would be needed for all present and future payment obligations. 
This announcement was met by renewed panic across the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
as fresh realizations set in regarding the serious underfunding and fiscal ill health of the 
state’s public retirement systems. Similar realizations have reverberated across the 
country on a yearly basis as it becomes clear that the U.S. public pensions crisis that 
started in the brutal aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis has shown no real signs of 
subsiding. Indeed, the Pew Center on Public Sector Retirement Systems reported last 
year that, as of the 2014 fiscal year, state-run retirement systems across the country 
combined to have a $934 billion funding gap between promises made via pension 
benefits to workers and the funding need to fulfill all these obligations (Pew 2016). 
These reported figures do not include the fiscal years 2015 and 2016, which are feared 
to be worse in the funding gap by the Pew Center on Public Sector Retirement 
Systems due to the estimated weakness of investment performance (Pew 2016). One 
thing, above all else, is certain with this report and many like it: the public pension 
crisis across this country is not going away any time soon, even though other 
economic measures seem to suggest that the effects of the financial crisis have 
subsided.  
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 Public Retirement Systems, administered by the states themselves, have 
become a large target for this political interference and influence as states find ways to 
elude their required contributions to these public pension plans to balance budgets 
and stave off sizeable budget deficits (Stalebrink 2014). Coinciding with the pension 
crisis roiling state retirement systems across the country, has been the growth of 
blatant political partisanship over the past eight plus years on the federal, state, and 
local levels. Over this time frame, but especially since the 2010 midterm elections, 
when the Tea Party came into being on the national level, the center of the political 
spectrum has all but been wiped out as both the Democratic and Republican parties 
have radicalized and moved away from the center into their respective political camps. 
State political parties have not been immune to this growth of partisanship, with some 
state parties walking further to the left or the right than their neighbors or federal 
counterparts, mainly due to different ideological strands dependent on local 
conditions. In addition, the expansion of state level gridlock induced by the rapidly 
increasing instances of divided government across state governments around the 
country have not helped matters. Thus, a side effect from this growth in partisanship 
on both sides of the aisle are the ever-increasing amounts of political interference and 
influence in dozens of programs on every level of government, especially on the state 
level, due to the continuous gridlock in Washington, D.C. (Stalebrink 2014). 
 These two topics of pension underfunding and political partisanship, especially 
in the states, should be explored in more detail to assess whether any pertinent 
connections exist between the two. This capstone investigates the relationship 
between partisanship and state pension plan funding through two guiding research 
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questions: does divided government of individual states have any effect on the funded 
ratio of state-administered retirement systems? What impact does Democratic control 
of state government institutions have on the funded ratio of state-administered 
retirement systems? These two questions, answered by an extensive analysis, will be 
able to show if there are any correlations between pension underfunding and political 
partisanship.  
 This study, contained in the proceeding sections, includes a problem statement, 
a concise background section highlighting key concepts pertinent to state-run public 
retirement systems, an in-depth review of the current state of academic literature on 
public pension plans, and a research design elaborating the paper’s analytic approach. 
Following these sections, an examination of the analytical results, limitations, and 
recommendations will conclude this study. 
Problem Statement 
 
 While the Pew Center on Public Sector Retirement Systems has calculated the 
funding gap, between what state governments have promised in pension benefits for 
workers to funding that is available to make good on all these obligations, at $934 
billion as of 2014, other researchers think that the funding gap is much larger. One 
piece of research recently found evidence that suggested state-run public retirement 
systems in the U.S. are currently underfunded to the amount of around $1 to $3 trillion 
(Shnitser 2015). Stalebrink (2014), using a different calculation method based around 
market-to-market accounting principles that changes how the discount rate values 
future obligations, calculates the funding gap at $3.2 trillion. Regardless of the 
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researcher or the calculation method used, these funding gaps, officially known as 
unfunded liabilities in pension parlance, are not going to go away all by themselves. It 
will take considerable technical knowledge and consistent policy improvements on the 
part of states, state government institutions, and retirement system administrative 
agencies to reduce this combined unfunded liability across all state-administered 
retirement systems.  
 While knowledge of unfunded liabilities is important to understanding the dire 
state of public retirement systems across the country, this study is primarily concerned 
with another key metric of public pension plan health, that of the funded ratio. The 
funded ratio is defined as the ratio of actuarial assets divided by actuarial accrued 
liabilities (Public Plans Data 2001-2015). This ratio was encountered in the previous 
section as the percentage of the total funding that would be needed for all present and 
future payment obligations. Since 2008, the funded ratio has been used in conjunction 
with unfunded liabilities as the primary measures to judge the health of a public 
retirement system and whether the retirement system in question is sufficiently funded 
or not (Munnell et al. 2008). This paper will use the funded ratio as the prime measure 
of public retirement system health, as per the current stock of literature 
recommendations (Munnell et al. 2008).  
 Given all the challenges that public retirement systems are currently battling, it is 
absolutely critical to keep investigating potential factors that impact public retirement 
systems in general, and the funded ratio, in particular. These investigations could 
continue to prove crucial to policy makers to affect positive change for the benefit of 
public pension plans and their health. While various studies have been conducted to 
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explain different impacts on the funded ratio, a study investigating the potential 
connection between political partisanship and pension health via the funded ratio has 
not been attempted. Such a study would allow state lawmakers to see the effect of 
political conflict on state fiscal and retirement policy choices, and pursue more 
collaborative evidence-based approaches to put state-administered retirement 
systems on a fiscally healthy path for future beneficiaries. In addition, this type of study 
will be of great interest to citizens, public sector employees, and most importantly 
voters to determine which party, and whether united or divided government, takes the 
most fiscal care of public retirement systems.  
 This study will analyze the relationship between the funded ratio of state-
administered retirement systems and a set of explanatory variables that represent 
partisan political control of the state houses, state senates, state governorships, and 
the concept of divided government. Other variables will be used to control for some 
economic conditions and other varied pension characteristics. The ultimate objective is 
to find an answer for the two research questions posed in the previous section. Based 
on my readings of the public retirement system literature, that is detailed in the 
literature review section of this study, and my own educated guesses, I hypothesize 
that divided government, during the time frame of 2001-2015, between the state 
houses, state senates, and state governorships will adversely affect the funded ratio. In 
addition, I hypothesize that partisan political control does have an impact on the 
funded ratio via adverse effects when Republicans are in control, versus a positive 
effect on the funded ratio when Democrats are in control of the state government 
institutions since they have been known as the party of the working class and strong 
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supporters of retirement benefits since the founding of the New Deal Coalition (Hacker 
2004). 
Background 
 
 In both the public and private sectors in the United States, employees are 
typically enrolled in a retirement plan to aid in living comfortably in the post-
employment phase of their lives. They are enrolled in either a defined benefit retirement 
plan or a defined contribution retirement plan. Both types of plans offer individual 
strengths and weaknesses, but they are structured very differently in how they operate 
and where the burden of the potential risk falls. A defined benefit retirement plan 
guarantees a particular monthly payout over all their retirement years, dependent on a 
formula defined by the plan administrator. This formula usually contains several factors 
governing its calculation, including the pay of the employee, retirement age, and years 
of employment (commonly known as service time) (Bikker & De Dreu 2009). The 
monthly payout to the employee is then computed based off this set formula. In 
addition, since these plans guarantee a certain level of benefits via the set formula, the 
plan administrator assumes the risk of potential shortfalls in the payouts. In essence, if 
the plan’s investment returns are not as assumed and expected, the employer must 
cover the shortfall in funds (Novy-Marx & Rauh 2009). A predominant portion of 
retirement plans for the public sector, including for several state-administered 
retirement plans, are defined benefit plans. 
 On the other hand, a defined contribution plan is where contributions by the 
employee and the employer are paid into an individual retirement account for each 
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employee. These contributions are then invested into all manner of investment vehicles 
and the resultant returns (which could be either positive, negative, or unchanging) go 
back into the employee’s account, allowing it to hopefully keep growing in this manner 
until retirement (Bikker & De Dreu 2009). This is the most common type of retirement 
plan in the private sector, with a 401(k) being the most common example. While there 
is no guarantee with this type of retirement plan, it is hoped that the market 
performance of the investments will grow the retirement account, taking typical market 
fluctuations into account (Novy-Marx & Rauh 2009). Since there is no guarantee for a 
set amount of benefit payout, the investment risk in this retirement plan sits with the 
employee. 
 It is prudent to note that every retirement system is not the same; each has its 
own individual and unique characteristics. This holds true for every state-administered 
retirement system. As mentioned above, most state-run retirement systems are still 
defined benefit plans, but the change to defined contribution plans is growing more 
widespread, with this switch often accelerating in certain states due to the 2008 
Financial Crisis (2016 Pew). In addition to these growing changes, some states, such 
as Alaska, have started to experiment with hybrid plans that combine the structure of 
both retirement plans types. These plans are officially known as either cash balance or 
pension equity retirement plans (Bikker & De Dreu 2009).  
 It should also be noted that contributions for each individual employee from the 
employer in public retirement systems are all added together and contributed to the 
retirement system as one big block. Actuaries estimate these contribution levels, 
known as actuarial required contributions (ARC), that states must contribute to cover 
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current and future benefits for employees, and make good on the total value of benefits 
for members of the retirement system. These contributions are then allocated to 
several different investment vehicles and securities to meet the future benefits needed 
(Blake, Lehmann, & Timmermann 1999). Actuaries also make long term assumptions 
and projections regarding the performance of the investments invested in by the 
system. Typically, these projections and assumptions on investment returns are quite 
optimistic, with the average being around an eight percent return (Coggburn & Kearney 
2010). Because the future benefits to be paid and the future investment returns are not 
known for certain, but are only estimated, there is no guarantee that the contribution 
levels will be enough to actually meet the benefits that need to be paid out (Coggburn 
& Kearney 2010). Simply, this means that even with estimates of required contributions 
and projected investment returns by trained actuaries, sometimes the ARC is not 
enough to keep pension plans up to speed with payouts for benefits. Overall, this is 
one of the most critical concepts in understanding public retirement systems—the 
concept of pension funding. 
Literature Review 
 
Over the course of several years, numerous studies have analyzed and reviewed 
the various factors affecting the fiscal solvency, and most importantly, the 
sustainability of public retirement systems. While several of these studies have taken 
place over the past 20 years as a result of emergent problems in public pension 
systems, Abigail R. Bacon’s 1980 study serves as an initial precursor to the large 
uptick in literature from the mid ’90s onward. Bacon sought to evaluate what funding 
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method would work best for municipal governments between the full funding scheme 
or the pay-as-you-go financing scheme. Bacon (1980) suggested that there was merit 
in the pay-as-you-go funding method being used by municipal and state governments, 
and advocated that public administrators get a bigger seat at the table in determining 
pension policy to offset the competing interests between legislators and retirement 
system officials.   
This initial analysis set the table for the current range of studies covering public 
pension plans and various factors that impact their funding. The following paragraphs 
review the literature on public retirement systems to establish the importance of the 
various factors that affect pension funding. In particular, this review highlights the 
absence of research that considers how partisan political control of state government 
institutions impacts public pension plan funding. Fully understanding this complex 
public policy field requires research that considers political control alongside well 
established influences.    
In 1994, researchers from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that 
the governance of public pensions plans did have an impact on their performance 
(Mitchell & Hsin 1994). More specifically, they found that pension funding—as 
explained in the background section—was stronger, more consistent, and met required 
contributions when a particular system employed pension professionals on its staff and 
when its governing board did not consist of employees that were a part of the 
retirement system. The major conclusion was that funding and plan performance could 
be linked to pension board characteristics and reporting requirements, in addition to 
plan investment strategy and the allocation of assets. These subtopics in the larger 
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field of public retirement systems have consistently been studied to the present day. In 
1999, a group of researchers evaluated the performance of plans around the direction 
of asset allocation via pension funds in the United Kingdom (Blake, Lehmann, & 
Timmermann 1999). Their analysis found that a system’s allocation between low 
volatility and high volatility assets does have an impact on fund performance, with high 
volatility assets and/or actively managed assets having a higher risk of uneven 
performance (Blake, Lehmann, & Timmermann 1999). This analysis was the first 
academic evaluation of the performance of managed portfolios in relation to public 
retirement system performance, and the authors make it a point to emphasize that their 
evidence regarding managed portfolios could apply to pension plans in the United 
States.  
 In 2000, Hans-Werner Sinn wrote a key review recapitulating the studies in the 
particular strand of literature that had arisen around Bacon’s (1980) foray into funding 
methods. He argues that while the current system of PAYGO (pay-as-you-go) financing 
is quite inefficient when it comes to rate of return, and that a fully funded system offers 
evidence-based superior performance in the rate of return arena, there is almost 
nothing to gain for public pension plans to switch to the fully funded method in terms 
of present value (Sinn 2000). In fact, the study provides empirical evidence that a 
transition between the funding methods would not affect tax burdens or honoring 
existing pension promises, and thus be inefficient. In addition, Barr (2002) largely 
confirmed Sinn’s findings, but in the space of reforming public pension plans as a 
whole, not just in funding method. However, Barr (2002) argued that effective 
government, organized in whichever manner, is a key requirement for a competently 
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run pension plan, and at this point, government cannot get out of the pension 
business.  
Additional public retirement system analysis has shown that pensions boards 
directed by member-elected trustees are important to ascertain good investment 
performance for pension plan assets (note that this is different from overall retirement 
system performance) and that these trustees have the potential to block the political 
problem of governments using pension assets as budgetary safety nets (Hess 2005). 
Clark and Urwin (2008) present an extensive set of best practices in the area of 
pension governance and suggest that application of these comprehensive best 
practices can improve system performance and the pension institution as a whole. 
 In 2008, a team of researchers at the Center for Retirement Research, located at 
Boston College, established clear evidence that the best measure for funding 
performance during the current recession climate (and subsequent post-recession 
climate) was the funded ratio (Munnell et al. 2008). Before this establishment, several 
researchers used unfunded liabilities and net assets as some prime measures of 
funding performance. While these are still very strong measures in their own right, 
Munnell and her colleagues provided strong support that the funded ratio is the main 
measure to determine if a public pension plan has the funding for existing and future 
claims. This study also provided evidence that another primary factor in determining 
funding performance is the ability of the system to make its actuarial required 
contribution (ARC) on an annual basis. Basically, if a system does not fund up to ARC, 
an increase in the plan’s unfunded liabilities is very likely, which causes the funded 
ratio of the system to decrease. Furthermore, Truesdell (2011) provides evidence 
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suggesting that systems with a higher ARC also have a lower funded ratio and that 
there is a strong correlation between these two measures.  
 Coggburn and Kearney (2010) explore the relationship between politics and 
public retirement systems. Their findings indicate that the level of pension contributions 
from the state governments are directly related to overall pension funding and funding 
performance in general (Coggburn & Kearney 2010). They also find that the 
professionalism of the state legislature and state fiscal constraints also significantly 
affect pension funding. Additionally, they found that political ideology is significantly 
related to other postemployment benefits (such as health care for retirees), which 
means that this is one of the earliest contemporary studies to examine the role of 
politics in the performance of pension plans. On the other hand, Thom (2013) finds that 
the enactment of public employee defined contribution accounts (away from the typical 
defined benefit accounts) was largely due to Republican legislative partisanship (Thom 
2013). Furthermore, Stalebrink (2014) found empirical evidence to suggest that the 
adoption of investment return assumptions by investment boards is partially explained 
by the boards’ connection to the political process. His evidence shows that high 
investment return assumptions are typically adopted when these investment boards 
have a particular proportion of political appointees (Stalebrink 2014). He also finds that 
fiscally unhealthy plans consistently adopt higher investment return assumptions than 
their healthier cousins. These studies reflect an emerging but small literature that 
examines the effect of partisan political control on public retirement systems.   
Two recent studies have also advanced the literature in regards to public 
retirement systems. A researcher at the University of Kentucky was able to corroborate 
	 16 
Truesdell’s original assertion that systems with a higher ARC also have a lower funded 
ratio by investigating the inverse of this relationship. Simply, the empirical results show 
that higher funded ratios for states lead to a lower ARC, which in turn directly 
supported the findings of previous studies (Skop 2013). This particular study further 
found that the funded ratio is positively affected by actuarial assets. In addition, Groves 
(2014) found that several governance characteristics have an impact on the funded 
ratio. He argues that public pension plans with a special investment council to control 
investment decisions and asset allocation is better than letting the pension board 
handle the investment decisions (Groves 2014). These councils could lead to an 
increase of up to 7% in the funded ratios compared to systems that do not have these 
special councils. 
It has been clearly shown in this review section that there is a wide-ranging 
literature that examines various facets of pension plans in general, and public 
retirement systems, specifically. This literature has grown in breadth and depth over 
the last twenty plus years to cover a sizeable portion of our understanding on how 
pensions behave and how these behaviors will affect pensions in the future. Since 
several public retirement systems across the country are surrounded by crises, it is not 
too far of stretch to say that this set of literature will continue to expand to more 
comprehensive levels. The proceeding empirical analysis will expand on the research 
mentioned in this section and use it as guidance, whilst employing the most current 
data regarding state retirement systems, to evaluate the effect of partisan political 
control of the state legislative houses and the governorship on the funded ratio. 
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Research Design 
 
 This study will use quantitative statistical analysis to answer the two research 
questions posed previously in the Introduction section. The key objective of this study, 
and thus, this research design described herein, is to determine, and evaluate, the 
impact of partisan political control of state government institutions on the funded ratio 
of state-administered retirement systems. As review, the funded ratio is the ratio of 
actuarial assets divided by actuarial accrued liabilities, usually displayed as a 
percentage. It is possible to have a ratio of one or more for this measure, which means 
that the retirement system would be able to payout all present and future benefit 
obligations. Additionally, in this study, state government institutions are the state 
houses, state senates, and the state governorships.  I define a state-administered 
retirement system as any state pension plan that is directly administered by the state 
or a state agency. This definition allows retirement systems of state employees, 
teachers, education employees, fire, police, higher education employees, and county 
employees to be included in the study, and does not limit this analysis to only state 
employees. Finally, it is important to understand that the number of retirement systems 
is not the same across states. As an example, Texas has five state-administered 
retirement systems, while Florida has just one.     
Data 
 
 The data used for this study primarily comes from the Public Plans Database 
(PPD) created by Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research (CRR) and the 
Center for State and Local Government Excellence. This extensive panel dataset 
contains 15 years of data from 2001-2015 for each retirement system contained within 
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the set, and includes 95% of total pensions assets in the United States between state 
and locally administered retirement plans. The data is broken down by each individual 
retirement plan, state, and fiscal years between 2001-2015.  
Since I wish to analyze only state-administered retirement system funded ratios, 
I excised locally administered systems (county, city, and school district retirement 
systems) and the several retirement systems run by the District of Columbia. Next, I 
pulled various state political variables from the University of Kentucky Center for 
Poverty Research’s National Welfare dataset, created binary dummy variables to 
represent partisan control of state governorships, state houses, state senates, and 
whether the state government was divided or not, and matched all of this data with the 
corresponding retirement system, state, and fiscal year to be my political variables to 
represent partisan political control and act as my primary explanatory variables. I had 
to excise the one retirement system contained in the PPD for the state of Nebraska, 
since it has a unicameral legislature and is typically excluded from studies involving 
state politics. I also pulled and matched data for states’ total nominal revenue, revenue 
growth, and state population to the corresponding retirement system, state, and fiscal 
year from the U.S. Census Bureau via the State & Local Government Finance Data 
Query System, hosted by the Tax Policy Center. Overall, my dataset, primarily built 
around the PPD, and also including numerous variables from two other datasets, 
contains data for 114 state-administered retirement systems across 49 states from the 
years 2001-2015, for a total of 1,710 observations. 
Model 
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 This study uses a fixed-effects regression analysis of four different regressions 
to test the hypotheses previously mentioned in the problem statement section. A fixed-
effects regression is best for a panel dataset because the panel data has multiple 
observations for each retirement system, which allows it to capture several variations 
over the time period measured for each state-administered retirement system caused 
by unobservable or unique characteristics that are fixed or unchanging. In essence, a 
fixed-effects regression does not measure the total deviations between the retirement 
system observations; instead it measures the deviations of each observation from the 
retirement system average. This average is then able to capture a lot of the 
unobservable and unique characteristics of the state-administered retirement systems.  
On the other hand, a study structured around a statistical regression analysis 
must be aware of the potential problem of endogeneity. Thus, it would be prudent to 
build a check into this study that combats the potential for endogeneity that might 
permeate the results. In light of this, the fixed-effects regression analysis used in this 
study consists of four different models, one that is a standard fixed-effects regression, 
while the other three explore the effects of lags on the variables in 1 year, 3 year, and 5 
year increments, respectively. A lag model will use a time lagged value of the 
explanatory variables using older values instead of the current values. In essence, if a 
past value of the explanatory variables is significant, it will accurately reflect if it is 
causing the dependent funded ratio, rather than the other way around. Besides being a 
robustness check for endogeneity, the three lag models are beneficial to explore the 
idea that it is the past political situation in the state, as much as the current political 
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climate, which determines the current state of pension funding for state-administered 
retirement systems.     
After putting together, cleaning, and formatting my dataset, I used the statistical 
software package, STATA, to run my models. My hypotheses are arranged to evaluate 
the impact of partisan political control of state government institutions on the funded 
ratio of state-administered retirement systems. Essentially, each model is set up with 
the funded ratio as the dependent variable, and various explanatory variables, with the 
political variables being the primary explanatory variables. The fixed-effects regression 
equation follows: 
Funded Ratio i,t = αi + β1*Divided Government1 i,t-n + β2*Democratic 
Governor2 i,t-n + β3*Democratic State House3 i,t-n + β4*Democratic State 
Senate4 i,t-n + β5*Democratic State House %5 i,t-n + β6*Democratic State 
Senate %6 i,t-n + β7*Total State Revenue7 i,t-n + β8*State Revenue Growth8 i,t-
n + β9*Actuarial Assets9 i,t-n + β10*Unfunded Liability10 i,t-n + β11*ARC11 i,t-n 
+ β12*Percent of ARC Paid12 i,t-n + β13*1-year Investment Return13 i,t-n + 
β14*Asset % in Equities14 i,t-n + β15*Asset % in Bonds15 i,t-n + β16*Total 
Retirement System Membership16 i,t-n + ε i,t-n 
 
 In the equation, n is an indicator for the four-different fixed-effects regressions 
that comprise this analysis, thus each model has a different n to represent the number 
of lag years used. Model A is the standard fixed-effects regression that does not 
contain any lag and comprises the full dataset from 2001-2015. Model B is a fixed-
effects regression that has a 1-year lag on all the explanatory variables containing data 
from 2002-2015. Next, Model C has a 3-year lag on the explanatory variables used for 
the fixed-effects regression, meaning that the data put into this regression runs from 
2004-2015. Finally, Model D is executed with a 5-year lag on the explanatory variables, 
running data from 2007-2015.     
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Variables 
 
The dependent variable for this study is the funded ratio of the state-
administered retirement systems. The current literature clearly states that the fiscal 
health of retirement systems is best described by the funded ratio. Table 1 displays 
essential information regarding the six partisan political control variables whose impact 
on the funded ratio are the focus of this paper; thus, they are termed the primary 
explanatory variables. The table describes how they are defined for the purpose of this 
study’s analysis, their unit of measurement, and their predicted relationship to the 
funded ratio. Four of the primary explanatory variables are binary “dummy” variables 
that are designed to display information compiled from multiple individual variables, 
while the other two have percentages, expressed as a number between zero and one, 
as their unit of measurement.   
Table 1. Primary Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition 
Unit of 
Measurement 
Hypothesized 
Relationship to 
Ratio 
Divided 
Government 
Whether the state 
government 
institutions are all 
controlled by one 
party or there is 
divided 
government 
0 = Non-Divided 
Government 
1 = Divided 
Government Negative 
Democratic 
Governor 
Whether the 
Governor of a state 
is a Republican or 
Democrat   
0 = Republican 
Governor  
1 = Democratic 
Governor Positive 
Democratic State 
House 
Whether the State 
House of a state is 
controlled by 
0 = Republican 
Controlled State 
House Positive 
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Republicans or 
Democrats   
1 = Democratic 
Controlled State 
House 
Democratic State 
Senate 
Whether the State 
Senate of a state is 
controlled by 
Republicans or 
Democrats   
0 = Republican 
Controlled State 
Senate 
1 = Democratic 
Controlled State 
Senate Positive 
Democratic State 
House % 
Proportion of State 
House members 
that is Democrat 0-1 Positive 
Democratic State 
Senate % 
Proportion of State 
Senate members 
that is a Democrat 0-1 Positive 
 
 Divided government articulates if the state government in question is operating 
as a divided government or a non-divided government. Political scientists define a 
government as divided if one political party controls the state executive branch, while 
the opposing political party controls one or both houses of the state legislative branch. 
On the other hand, if one party controls the governorship and both houses of the state 
legislature, some term this as a trifecta government. There has been a long debate in 
the political science community regarding whether divided government leads to more 
or less gridlock, thus this study should determine how divided government and its 
gridlock potential affects the funded ratio. I hypothesize that divided state government 
will have a negative impact on the funded ratio. Democratic Governor, Democratic 
State House, and Democratic State Senate articulates the political party in the control 
of these three state government institutions. An observation for any of these three 
variables coded as a zero represents Republican control, while a code of one 
represents Democratic control. For the sake of the legislative houses, partisan control 
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is determined by which party has the majority. I hypothesize that state government 
institutions controlled by Democrats have a positive effect on the funded ratio. 
Democratic State House % and Democratic State Senate % articulates the proportion 
of seats in each house of the legislative branch that is controlled by Democrats, 
expressed as a number between zero and one, with numbers closer to one meaning 
Democrats hold more seats. I hypothesize that the percentage of seats in both houses 
of the state legislatures held by Democrats will have a positive effect on the funded 
ratio. 
 Table 2 displays critical information about the secondary explanatory variables 
that control for various factors related to state governments and state run public 
pensions plans. These ten variables were selected as secondary explanatory variables 
because retirement systems literature has shown that these variables have various 
effects on the funded ratio. This is especially true of the various retirement system and 
actuary variables that are well known to have impacts on the funded ratio. These 
variables help support the key study objective of a clear evaluation of the effects of the 
six partisan political control variables on the funded ratio.             
Table 2. Secondary Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition 
Unit of 
Measurement 
Hypothesized 
Relationship to 
Ratio 
Total State 
Revenue 
Total nominal state 
revenue by year Millions of dollars Negative 
State Revenue 
Growth 
Revenue growth 
percentage from 
previous year 0-1 Positive 
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Actuarial Assets 
Actuarial 
determined amount 
of assets Millions of dollars Positive 
Unfunded Liability 
Actuarial accrued 
liability minus 
actuarial assets. 
AKA the funding 
gap. Millions of dollars Negative 
ARC 
Employer’s Annual 
Required 
Contribution to 
cover current and 
unfunded liabilities Millions of dollars Positive 
% of ARC Paid 
Percentage of ARC 
that employer paid 0-1 Positive 
1-year Investment 
Return 
1 year Investment 
Return Percentage 0-1 Negative 
Asset % in Equities 
Percentage of 
assets invested in 
equities  0-1 Positive 
Asset % in Bonds  
Percentage of 
assets invested in 
bonds 0-1 Positive 
Total Retirement 
System 
Membership 
Total number of 
people enrolled in 
the retirement 
system  
Thousands of 
people Negative 
 
Analysis and Results 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Table 3 below illustrates the basic summary statistics of all the variables that 
were used in the regression models, as constructed in the prior section. It can be 
clearly seen that there is large data variation between state-administered retirement 
systems in most of the non-binary variables. This is especially highlighted while looking 
at the entries for Total State Revenue, State Revenue Growth, Actuarial Assets, 
Unfunded Liability, ARC, and Total Retirement System Membership. These large 
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variations for the two revenue variables can be explained by the differences in revenue 
capacity of very populous states, states with limited population, states with tax codes 
advantageous for revenue generation versus states with highly inefficient tax codes, 
and individual state specific characteristics. The pension variables display the relative 
difference between some small state-run retirement systems, that will of course have 
fewer enrolled members and assets, as compared to large state-administered 
retirement systems that will often have a large number of enrolled members, a large 
asset base, and more often than not a high amount of liabilities due to the many 
enrolled members. It is also important to note that the two revenue variables have a 
lower amount of observations than all the other variables used in this study’s model 
simply from the fact that revenue data for 2015 (the last observation year in the panel 
dataset) has not been published for the vast majority of states. 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observ-ations Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max 
Funded Ratio 1,678 0.818 0.196 0.191 1.974 
Divided 
Government# 1,710 0.460 0.499 0 1 
Democratic 
Governor# 1,710 0.481 0.500 0 1 
Democratic 
State House# 1,710 0.532 0.499 0 1 
Democratic 
State Senate# 1,710 0.458 0.498 0 1 
Democratic 
State House % 1,710 0.516 0.146 0.13 0.92 
Democratic 
State Senate % 1,710 0.498 0.160 0.11 0.96 
Total State 
Revenue* 1,596 42.0 48.1 0.825 353.0 
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State Revenue 
Growth  1,596 0.081 0.302 -0.90 4.645 
Actuarial Assets*  1,679 20.5 31.6 0.648 301.0 
Unfunded 
Liability*  1,678 4.7 8.9 -17.7 93.5 
ARC 1,696 570646.4 896761.4 0 7988037 
% of ARC Paid  1,694 0.938 0.549 0 17.277 
1-year 
Investment 
Return  
1,696 0.064 0.111 -0.296 0.288 
Asset % in 
Equities 1,710 0.527 0.132 0 0.997 
Asset % in 
Bonds  1,710 0.274 0.10 0 1 
Total Retirement 
System 
Membership 
1,681 202215 254431 6789 1871845 
#These are Binary Dummy Variables 
*These numbers are reported in millions 
 
Regression Results 
 
Table 4 displays the regression results of all four models. There are some very 
unexpected relationships among the six variables representing partisan political control 
of state government institutions and the funded ratio of state-administered retirement 
systems. In Model A, of the six variables that this study is focusing on regarding 
partisan control, only three are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. On the other 
hand, one of the political control variables also has statistical significance, but it is at 
the 0.1 level, which is not at the accepted level of significance for policy studies. 
Overall, of the six partisan political control variables, only three have a statistically 
significant impact on the funded ratio in Model A. 
Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = 
Funded Ratio 
Model A – 
No Lag 
Model B –  
1 Year Lag 
Model C – 
3 Year Lag 
Model D – 
5 Year Lag 
VARIABLES Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
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(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Divided Government# 0.0183*** 
(0.00543) 
0.0119** 
(0.00507) 
0.00635 
(0.00492) 
0.00908* 
(0.00516) 
Democratic Governor# -0.00550 
(0.00587) 
-0.00179 
(0.00549) 
-0.00479 
(0.00529) 
0.00123 
(0.00545) 
Democratic State House# -0.0334*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0341*** 
(0.00950) 
-0.0186** 
(0.00896) 
-0.0170* 
(0.00911) 
Democratic State Senate# -0.0151 
(0.0102) 
-0.00512 
(0.00995) 
-0.0122 
(0.00899) 
-0.0171* 
(0.00950) 
Democratic State House % -0.110* 
(0.0615) 
-0.0285 
(0.0577) 
-0.0799 
(0.0569) 
-0.0761 
(0.0617) 
Democratic State Senate % 0.281*** 
(0.0531) 
0.162*** 
(0.0501) 
-0.0216 
(0.0502) 
-0.0827 
(0.0560) 
Total State Revenue -8.81e-10*** 
(1.92e-10) 
-9.02e-10*** 
(1.85e-10) 
-9.94e-10*** 
(1.77e-10) 
-1.50e-09*** 
(1.89e-10) 
State Revenue Growth 0.0185** 
(0.00840) 
0.0148* 
(0.00785) 
0.0168** 
(0.00706) 
0.0399*** 
(0.00698) 
Actuarial Assets 7.40e-09*** 
(5.91e-10) 
4.28e-09*** 
(5.93e-10) 
4.15e-11 
(6.58e-10) 
-3.17e-09*** 
(8.19e-10) 
Unfunded Liability  -9.24e-09*** 
(6.95e-10) 
-8.16e-09*** 
(7.48e-10) 
-5.30e-09*** 
(8.15e-10) 
-6.06e-09*** 
(9.86e-10) 
ARC -1.21e-08 
(7.97e-09) 
1.41e-08 
(1.03e-08) 
1.94e-08* 
(1.07e-08) 
3.03e-08*** 
(1.16e-08) 
% of ARC Paid 0.0196*** 
(0.00438) 
0.0163*** 
(0.00406) 
0.0140*** 
(0.00364) 
0.0122*** 
(0.00327) 
1-year Investment Return -0.104*** 
(0.0239) 
-0.0106 
(0.0222) 
0.0405** 
(0.0202) 
-0.0778*** 
(0.0196) 
Asset % in Equities 0.211*** 
(0.0249) 
0.201*** 
(0.0232) 
0.126*** 
(0.0236) 
0.0294 
(0.0263) 
Asset % in Bonds 0.175*** 
(0.0351) 
0.140*** 
(0.0329) 
0.0786** 
(0.0318) 
0.0814** 
(0.0319) 
Total Retirement System 
Membership 
-7.72e-07*** 
(1.26e-07) 
-5.49e-07*** 
(1.18e-07) 
-3.25e-07** 
(1.28e-07) 
1.06e-07 
(1.53e-07) 
     
Constant 0.673*** 
(0.0391) 
0.680*** 
(0.0372) 
0.859*** 
(0.0385) 
0.915*** 
(0.0433) 
N 1,576 1,553 1,325 1,097 
Groups 114 114 114 114 
R-squared 0.443 0.356 0.262 0.291 
Significance: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
#These are Binary Dummy Variables 
 
 The regression output for Model A shows that divided government has a 
positive and statistically significant relationship to the funded ratio of state-
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administered retirement systems. In essence, the effect of having a divided state 
government between Democrats and Republicans is a 0.018 increase on the funded 
ratio of state-run retirement systems. This is a very unexpected relationship and runs 
against my prediction that a divided state government would have a negative effect on 
the funded ratio. Based on these unexpected results, it seems that divided state 
government causes both political parties to moderate some of their more radical views 
about retirement system policy and proposals to just meet the ARC to keep up with 
pension obligations. Another possibility is perhaps retirement policy is not viewed as a 
strictly hot button partisan issue like environmental policy because there is a sense of 
obligation to state employees because funding pension obligations is an administrative 
function of the state.    
      No statistically significant relationship exists between the state having a 
Democratic governor and the funded ratio in any of the models. The effect of having a 
Democratic governor instead of a Republican governor has no impact. This means 
that, overall, political control of the governorship between the two political parties has 
no significant effect on the funded ratio of state-administered retirement system. This 
is a result that was not expected and refutes my hypothesis that governorships 
controlled by Democrats would have a positive impact on the funded ratio.  
 In Model A, a Democratic controlled state house has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship to the funded ratio of state-run retirement systems at the .01 
level. The relationship is that having a Democratic controlled state house versus a 
Republican controlled state house is a 0.033 reduction in the funded ratio. This 
negative relationship is contrary to my prediction. In fact, my initial hypothesis was that 
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Democratic control in state houses would have a positive impact on the funded ratio. 
Although my model cannot explain why a certain relationship exists, one potential 
explanation for this negative relationship is that a large amount of state houses that 
were controlled by the Democrats for a majority of the dataset’s 15-year time period, 
were also in Democratic hands during the 2008 financial crisis, and its immediate 
aftermath, which led to the beginning of the current pension crisis. Another potential 
explanation is that time matters in this case because it takes changes to state-
administered retirement systems a long time to accumulate.  
 Another relationship that is not statistically significant is between a Democratic 
controlled state senate and the funded ratio in three of the four models. In Model D, 
this relationship is significant at the 0.1 level, but for the other three models the effect 
of having a Democratic state senate instead of a Republican controlled state senate 
has no impact. This means that, overall, political control of the state senate between 
the two political parties has no significant effect on the funded ratio of state-
administered retirement system. This is a result that was not expected and refutes my 
hypothesis that state senates controlled by Democrats would have a positive 
relationship with the funded ratio. 
 Additionally, in Model A, the percentage of Democratic held seats in the state 
house has a negative effect on the funded ratio. However, this relationship is 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level, which is not the typical p-value standard for 
statistical significance in the public policy field. However, if one were to interpret the 
relationship, the impact is that the more seats in each state house that are held by 
Democrats yields a 0.110 decline in the funded ratio. This would disprove the 
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hypothesis that the proportion of state house members that are Democrats would have 
a positive impact on the funded ratio of state-run retirement systems. Another 
unexpected portion of this relationship is that it is not statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.  
Model A also shows that the percentage of seats in the state senates that are 
held by Democrats has a positive effect on the funded ratio. The relationship between 
these two is statistically significant at 0.01 level. In essence, the connection is that the 
more seats in state senates that are under Democratic control, it provides a 0.28 boost 
to the funded ratio of state-administered retirement systems. This positive relationship 
would confirm the hypothesis that the proportion of state senate seats that are held by 
Democrats has a positive effect on the funded ratio. Overall, of the six partisan political 
control variables, my standard model, Model A, had five unexpected results that 
disputed my original predictions, and one confirmed hypothesis. 
 Model B, which had a 1-year lag on every explanatory variable as a robustness 
check for endogeneity, to be sure that no reverse causation from the funded ratio was 
occurring, has most of the same results as Model A that was just discussed. 
Democratic Governor and Democratic controlled state senates are still not significant 
in their connection to the funded ratio. Democratic State House % changes from being 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level to having no significance in its relationship to the 
funded ratio. On the other hand, Democratic controlled state houses and Democratic 
State Senate % still remains statistically significant, at the 0.01 level, in their 
relationship with the funded ratio. Finally, Divided Government remains statistically 
significant and has a positive effect on the funded ratio, just at the 0.05 level, instead of 
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the 0.01 level it was at in Model A.  
 The 3-year lag that is included on the explanatory variables in Model C, paring 
the data run through the regression to 2004-2015, has some very unexpected 
outcomes. Only one of the six partisan political control variables, Democratic control of 
state houses, remains statistically significant in its relationship to the funded ratio of 
state-administered retirement systems. This relationship is at the 0.05 level, which is a 
slight step down from the previous 0.01 level found in Models A & B. All the other five 
political control variables have no statistical significance on the funded ratio in Model 
C.    
 In Model D, which contained a 5-year lag on the explanatory variables, some of 
the political variables return to the state of significance that they were at in Models A & 
B. Divided Government has a positive, statistically significant relationship to the funded 
ratio at the 0.1 level. Democratic control of the state houses remains significant in all 
four models, but in Model D is only significant at the 0.1 level. The percentage of seats 
held by Democrats in both state houses and state senates no longer have any 
significant connection to the funded ratio. However, Democratic control of state 
senates has a statistically significant relationship to the funded ratio for the first time in 
Model D. The relationship is a negative one at the 0.1 level.      
 Additionally, Table 4 also displays the significance of the ten secondary 
explanatory variables for all four models. In Model A, nine of the ten secondary 
explanatory variables have some type of statistically significant relationship with the 
funded ratio, and of those nine, all of them had the expected impact on the funded 
ratio. Eight of those nine have significance at the 0.01 level, and include total state 
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revenue, actuarial assets, unfunded liability, percentage of the ARC paid, 1-year 
investment returns, percentage of assets in equities and bonds, and the total 
retirement system membership. On the other hand, state revenue growth has a 
significant relationship to the funded ratio at the 0.05 level. While some of the 
relationships for these control variables change due to the lag models, a special note 
should be made regarding the behavior of the ARC in my statistical analysis. The 
literature points out that the ARC should have a positive, statistically significant 
relationship at the 0.01 level to the funded ratio. The ARC in the standard, no lag 
model, Model A, actually does the exact opposite: it has a negative, statistically 
insignificant impact on the funded ratio. In Models B and C, with the shorter time lags, 
the ARC has a positive relationship to the funded ratio, but is still not significant. Only 
in Model D, which contains a 5-year time lag, does the ARC finally behave as the 
literature reports it should. This study cannot offer an explanation for this unexpected 
behavior found in the ARC in the no lag model. Besides the unusual behavior of the 
ARC until the 5-year lag was introduced, all these relationships between the secondary 
explanatory variables and the funded ratio have happened previously in the literature 
and were expected. The model shows results that were expected from variables that 
are already known to have effects on the funded ratio of retirement systems. 
Limitations of Study 
 
 Following from the full regression analysis in the prior section, it is prudent to 
note the study’s limitations. The primary limitation of this study stems from the inability 
to accurately model the more in-depth characteristics of partisan policy agendas, 
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mandates, priorities, and the specific policy proposals of the two major political parties 
for the time period of the panel dataset used in the analysis due to this type of data 
only existing in some forms for particular locales. Until this data becomes more 
widespread, this more nuanced political information will be difficult to fit into these 
types of studies.  
In addition, it is important to point out that each political party is unique in each 
of these varied characteristics in all the individual states. When combining these 
factors, it becomes clear that individual policy proposals on a state-by-state basis due 
to partisan control of the governorships, the legislative houses, or whether the states 
governments are united or in a divided government induced stalemate, lead to a data 
limitation that is difficult to model in a comprehensive manner, especially over a 15-
year time frame. This, ultimately, leads to variation that is not observed by the panel 
dataset and that cannot be explained by the regression analysis conducted. It would 
be helpful if these varied, in-depth characteristics could be modeled by more nuanced 
political data for use in a statistical fashion, but as some of the characteristics 
described are qualitative in nature, one of the primary ways to overcome this limitation 
is to expand this study to incorporate a qualitative analysis. Specifically, future studies 
could further investigate the extent of the partisan split in the state legislative houses, 
more in-depth analysis of lags with political control, and the difference in individual 
state party ideology via the Squire Index.      
There are also two secondary limitations inherent to the design of the study 
itself. The first limitation is related to the uniqueness of individual retirement systems 
and the data collected in the PPD. All public retirement systems have characteristics 
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that are unique to each individual system. These characteristics lead to a limitation that 
is contained in the PPD data. In essence, the PPD does not include all these 
characteristics that are unique, thus these are unobserved factors that cannot be 
measured by the dataset. Although the fixed-effects regression is designed to pick up 
on these sorts of characteristics, it can only do this to the extent that the 
characteristics in question are stable features of each system over the time period of 
the panel. In turn, some of the variance experienced between each individual 
retirement system cannot be explained via any statistical method, especially if they are 
unstable features of the systems. The second limitation descends from the fact, that as 
mentioned prior, this study only concerns itself with state administered retirement 
systems. With this in mind, the results from this study cannot be generalized and are 
not applicable to locally administered retirement systems, due to differing 
characteristics between the retirement systems of two different administrative and 
government levels.  
Recommendations & Conclusions 
 
 Following the analysis and evaluation of the four models constructed to study 
any potential relationship between partisan political control of state government 
institutions and the funded ratio of state-administered retirement systems, 
recommendations can be made for lawmakers, citizens, public sector employees, and 
voters. Although five out of the six expected outcomes for the partisan political 
variables were refuted, and only one confirmed, in regards to the positive or negative 
nature of the impact on the funded ratio, an impact was shown. This study does 
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confirm that political control between the Republicans and Democrats of the state 
executive branch and the two houses of the state legislatures does affect the funded 
ratio. 
According to the results of the models deployed, divided state government has 
a positive impact on the funded ratio of retirement systems. Taking that into account, I 
recommend that both political parties pursue rational, evidence-based approaches to 
retirement system policy to ensure that funding for pension obligations is at acceptable 
levels on a continual basis. In essence, great attention to pension policy should be 
given no matter what political party is in control, but it is doubly important when 
operating in divided government. In addition, it would also be vitally important to study 
and learn from the particular states that have achieved better policy outcomes under 
divided government, especially in regards to retirement system policy. This could lead 
to the dissemination of the specific compromises and practices that were used to 
improve funding of state-administered retirement systems. It appears, according to the 
regression analysis, that the best structure for divided government is a state senate 
with a large proportion of seats held by Democrats, a Republican controlled state 
house, and a governor from either party that would hopefully all work together to either 
fix, maintain, or improve the fiscal health of state-administered retirement systems by 
keeping on top of the funding needed to meet all current and future obligations.   
 Considering this study as a whole, it becomes clear that politics does have an 
effect on state pension plans across this country. While a divided state government 
having a positive effect on the funding ratio was unexpected, it is up to each individual 
state lawmaker to decide if they want to aid in solving the pension crisis through 
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cooperation with the other political party. This study suggests that when working in a 
bipartisan manner, the two parties will do a better job of funding state-run retirement 
systems, even though it is not at the top of their policy priority list. States will have to 
solve their pension problems on their own, and it appears that when it comes to 
politics, no one side has all the answers. Both sides of the aisle will have to come 
together and put sound pension policy and cooperation to use in a hope to end the 
ongoing pension crisis. 
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